SPF Record Checker
Resolve the full include and redirect chain, count DNS lookups against the 10-lookup limit, and find duplicate mechanisms, void lookups and weak terminal policies.
Free domain tools
Every public CloudSpex checker in one place, grouped by the question it answers — from who may send email as your domain to whether a validating resolver still accepts your DNSSEC chain.
Each tool applies deterministic scoring to real measurements and says plainly when something could not be assessed. No signup required.
Who may send mail as your domain, and what receivers do when a message fails.
Resolve the full include and redirect chain, count DNS lookups against the 10-lookup limit, and find duplicate mechanisms, void lookups and weak terminal policies.
Fetch the DKIM record for a selector you know, interpret its tags, and see whether the public key is present, revoked or malformed.
Inspect the published policy, see how none, quarantine and reject differ in practice, and find records receivers cannot interpret.
The combined view: SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT measured together with one score, so you can see which part of the mail setup needs attention first.
List the mail servers in the order senders try them, with every IPv4 and IPv6 address, its reverse DNS and whether the PTR resolves back (FCrDNS).
Upload an aggregate report (.xml, .gz, .zip) to see every sender, how much passed DMARC, and which services pass SPF or DKIM for someone else's domain. Not stored.
Paste a header to trace the delivery path with the delay at each hop, and see the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results the receiving server recorded. Not stored.
Find the PTR name of an IPv4 or IPv6 address and check that it resolves back to the same IP (forward-confirmed reverse DNS), as mail receivers expect.
Check a domain against the Gmail, Yahoo and Microsoft sender requirements: SPF, DKIM and DMARC from DNS, plus the rules that must be verified on a real message.
Connect to a domain's mail servers on port 25: greeting, STARTTLS, TLS version, cipher and certificate validity. Stops before sending, so no email is delivered.
Read the BIMI record, see whether a logo and verified mark certificate are declared, and whether DMARC enforcement is strong enough for the logo to show.
Build a record that is valid before you publish it; the checkers read it back afterwards.
Convert an SVG logo to the SVG Tiny PS profile BIMI requires, see exactly what changed, and what still needs a designer. Not stored.
Choose the policy, subdomain policy, percentage, alignment and report addresses, and get the exact TXT host and value with the consequences of each choice stated.
Select your mail providers, IP ranges and includes to build one SPF record, with a DNS lookup count against the 10-lookup limit and a length warning.
Over the 10 DNS lookup limit? See what each include costs and get a flattened ip4/ip6 record, split into 255-character strings and _spf sub-records when needed.
Paste a DKIM public key and selector to get the exact TXT host and value, with the key type and size read from the key. Private keys are refused.
Build the MTA-STS TXT record and the mta-sts.txt policy file from your MX hosts and mode, with the exact address the file must be served from.
Build a TLS-RPT TXT record with email or https report destinations, so sending servers report TLS delivery failures to you.
Build a BIMI TXT record from your SVG logo and mark certificate addresses, with the DMARC and logo conditions inboxes require stated.
Whether mail to your domain travels over TLS, and how delivery problems get reported.
Read the _mta-sts record, fetch the actual policy file, and report the real mode — a published record alone enforces nothing.
Check DANE for a domain's mail servers: TLSA records per MX, whether DNSSEC validates them, and whether they match the certificate the server actually presents.
Check the _smtp._tls record, list the reporting destinations, and find records that are published but cannot receive a single report.
The layer everything else stands on: resolution, delegation, signing and issuance control.
See every common record a name publishes (A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA, SRV, CAA) with TTLs, or an IP's PTR record, with failed lookups never shown as missing.
Ask 16 public resolvers for the same record and compare each answer with the value read directly from the domain's own nameserver, not just with the majority.
Test whether the domain resolves at all and separate DNS root causes from the SSL and HTTP failures they masquerade as.
Check whether a domain's website, mail servers and nameservers are reachable over IPv6: AAAA records for the domain, www, MX and NS hosts, and HTTPS over IPv6.
Check whether the zone is signed and whether a validating resolver accepts the chain — including the broken state that makes a domain unreachable for most users.
Ask every delegated nameserver directly, find lame delegation, and see when servers disagree about the same zone.
Every valid certificate issued for a domain and its subdomains from the public CT logs: which authorities issued them and which host names they reveal.
Find the network (ASN) and owner behind an IP, or behind a domain's web and mail servers, and whether each route is RPKI-valid.
See which certificate authorities may issue for the domain, and find CAA policies that accidentally block all issuance.
What a visitor's browser actually gets: the certificate, the protocols and the response headers.
Find common subdomains whose CNAME still points to a deleted GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3, Azure or similar service, with the evidence for each finding.
One read-only handshake: certificate validity and expiry, SAN coverage, chain state, negotiated cipher and which TLS versions the server accepts.
Check that a website publishes a valid /.well-known/security.txt under RFC 9116: Contact, Expires, Canonical, content type and signature, with a starter file if it is missing.
Review CSP, HSTS, framing protection, cookie flags, CORS and the rest of the response-header allowlist, with what's missing stated plainly.
One-time checks answer today's question; monitoring catches tomorrow's change.
Scan a prospect's domain and download a PDF report with your agency's name on the cover.
Registrar, expiry date and days left from the registry's own RDAP service (WHOIS as fallback), plus transfer lock, hold and deletion status.
See which AI crawlers (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, Google-Extended, PerplexityBot, CCBot and more) a site's robots.txt allows or blocks, and whether it has llms.txt.
Find registered domains that look like yours (typos, look-alike characters, other extensions) and see which of them can receive email.
Check up to 25 domains at once (resolves, MX, SPF, DMARC policy) in one table, downloadable as CSV. Built for agencies with many client domains.
DNS, SSL and HTTPS measured together with a single score and the failing layer identified — the widest one-time view of a domain.
The quickest entry point: a limited public scan of SSL, DNS and HTTPS health, with a path to continuous monitoring when you need history.
Yes. Every checker on this page runs without an account. Rate limits apply per visitor so the tools stay available for everyone.
Each checker applies a fixed, deterministic rule set, so the same configuration always produces the same score. Components that could not be measured are excluded from the score instead of being counted as failures.
When a lookup times out or a signal cannot be verified, CloudSpex reports 'not assessed' rather than guessing. An unmeasured component is not the same as a failing one, and the reports keep that distinction visible.
A checker answers today's question: how is this domain configured right now? CloudSpex monitoring re-measures your domains continuously and alerts you when the configuration drifts, so the next change does not go unnoticed.
These checkers show a domain as it is right now. CloudSpex monitoring re-measures your domains continuously — SSL expiry, DNS changes and email security signals — and alerts you when the configuration drifts.